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In the light of recent currency crises, two key policy questions are how to
defend a currency against attack and what the eﬀects of diﬀerent avenues of
defense are. A commonly used defense is to raise short-term interest rates
sharply to deter speculation. Interest rate defense has had both successes
and failures, some quite spectacular. For example, Hong Kong raised
overnight rates to several hundred percent and successfully defended its
currency in October 1997 against speculative attack. On the other hand,
Sweden similarly raised its interest rate by several hundred percent in its
currency defense in September 1992, but the success was short-lived. These
are but two examples. In many countries, raising very short-term rates to
very high levels to defend the exchange rate appeared to have little eﬀect in
deterring speculation, whereas in others, moderate increases in the interest
rate have seemed to dampen speculative pressures. In short, a ﬁrst look at
episodes leaves the question of the eﬀectiveness of an interest rate defense
very much open.
More formal empirical models are far from resolving this question. On the
basis of a sample of over 300 successful and failed attacks, Kraay (1999) ar-
gues that high interest rates are neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition
for preventing a devaluation. Hubrich (2000), in a large-sample study simi-
lar to Kraay’s, does identify signiﬁcant eﬀects of monetary policy during
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gratefully acknowledged.currency crises. He ﬁnds that raising the nominal discount rate may increase
the probability of a successful speculative attack, but that the result is con-
ventional when the monetary policy stance is identiﬁed through domestic
credit. He also examines how these results are aﬀected by country charac-
teristics, ﬁnding, for example, that countries with low prior reserves are more
likely to choose an interest rate defense than countries with high reserves.
The lack of empirical consensus is mirrored by a relatively small number
of theoretical papers on the interest rate defense. In spite of the importance
of the question, the role of interest rates is deterring a speculative attack is
only beginning to receive attention.1 Textbook models indicate that with
imperfect capital mobility high domestic currency interest rates are a tool
to attract foreign capital and strengthen the domestic currency. From a
more micro perspective, high interest rates deter speculation by increasing
the cost of speculation. More precisely, when speculators borrow domestic
currency to speculate against a ﬁxed exchange rate (they short the domestic
currency), high short-term interest rates make such borrowing very costly.
However, in assessing how high interest rates can deter speculation, this
argument runs into a simple arithmetic problem. If the horizon over which
a devaluation is expected is extremely short, interest rates must be raised to
extraordinarily high levels to deter speculation when there is even a small
expected devaluation. For example, even if foreign currency assets bore no
interest, an expected overnight devaluation of 0.5 percent would require an
annual interest rate of over 500 percent [(1.005365– 1)  100  517] to make
speculation unproﬁtable. (See, e.g., the discussion in Furman and Stiglitz
1998, 75–76.)
This reasoning has been used to call into question how eﬀective high in-
terest rates can be in deterring an attack, suggesting, for example, why the
Swedish defense failed. It suggests that sharply raising interest rates will
have only marginal beneﬁcial eﬀects at best. Although the arithmetic prob-
lem suggests why spectacular defenses may have only limited eﬀects, this
reasoning leaves other questions unanswered. First, why, as seems some-
times to be the case, might an interest rate defense lead to even greater spec-
tacular pressures against the currency? That is, why would there be perverse
feedback from raising interest rates to speculative pressures? Second, even
in the absence of perverse feedback eﬀects, the arithmetic problem raises
the question of why they ever work. How can an eﬀectively minor change in
the cost of speculation have such signiﬁcant, and one might say dispropor-
tional, eﬀects? There is another sort of disproportionality as well, namely
that short-lived increases in interest rates sometimes appear to have much
longer-term eﬀects. Something other than a simple cost-of-borrowing eﬀect
must be present.
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1. Formal models of an interest rate defense include Lall (1997), Drazen (2001), Lahiri and
Végh (2000), Drazen (2000), and Flood and Jeanne (2000).One possibility, which has been the focus of my research in this area, is
that both disproportional and perverse eﬀects reﬂect the information that
raising interest rates provides to market participants. Speciﬁcally, high in-
terest rates may signal the commitment of policy makers to defend the cur-
rency. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was the message the Swedish
Riksbank wanted to send.) If so, the direct cost implications of high inter-
est rates for speculators are irrelevant relative to the signal they provide. The
signal may be what makes interest rate defense successful.
By the same token, increases in speculative pressure in the wake of an in-
terest rate defense may also reﬂect a signaling eﬀect. Raising interest rates
instead of letting reserves decumulate in order to defend the currency may
signal weak fundamentals, such as low reserves. It may also be read as a sign
of government panic by speculators. Such information would only encour-
age further speculation.
Our central argument is that a major eﬀect of high interest rates is to sig-
nal the government’s willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. That
is, there are unobserved characteristics of the government that aﬀect the
probability that a defense will be mounted or continued, with policy choices
being correlated with these characteristics. Hence, given imperfect infor-
mation about these government characteristics, speculators use observed
policy choices to make inferences about them and hence form (that is, up-
date) the probability they assign to a devaluation. Signaling is presented not
as an esoteric theoretical point, but as what I hope will be seen as a very
sensible view of what governments are doing.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize some of this research, con-
centrating on the underlying theory, but with some discussion of the em-
pirical work supporting the argument that the eﬀects of high interest rates
are in part due to their signal content. The paper is meant as an introduc-
tion to the basic approach that I have used in a number of papers, rather
than as a paper meant to break new ground. That is, it is meant as a simple
user’s guide, as it were, to interest rate defense as a signal. Thus, the stress is
on simple models meant to get the basic points across. The plan of the pa-
per is as follows. In section 2.2, I discuss interest rate defense as a signal of
commitment to defending the exchange rate. In section 2.3, I introduce an
alternative way of defending and consider the information an interest rate
defense conveys about the ability of a government to defend. A key result is
that raising interest rates may send a negative signal, suggesting why there
can be perverse eﬀects. Section 2.4 presents some empirical evidence on the
signaling hypothesis. Section 2.5 contains conclusions.
2.2  A Basic Model of Signaling Commitment
I begin with a model of signaling commitment to keeping the exchange
rate ﬁxed by raising short-term interest rates. I want to keep the model ex-
Interest Rate Defense against Speculative Attack as a Signal 39tremely simple in order to highlight how this signaling of commitment
might work, that is, how raising interest rates allows a government that is
committed to defending the exchange rate to separate itself in the eyes of in-
vestors from one that is not. The model presented is a variant of the model
in Drazen (2001).
2.2.1 Basic Structure and Assumptions
Consider a ﬁnite-horizon discrete time model of defending the exchange
rate or abandoning it. The timing of actions within a period is as follows. At
the beginning of each period ta stochastic shock  tis observed by both gov-
ernment and speculators. This shock may be to reserves, to the economy,
and so on; the key point is that it aﬀects the cost of maintaining the ﬁxed ex-
change rate, as modeled below. Speculators then choose how much to spec-
ulate against the currency, given  t, the interest rate it, and the probability pt
they assign to a devaluation (of known size) at the end of the period. Specif-
ically, speculators borrow domestic currency from the government at an in-
terest rate it to be repaid at the end of the period and use it to buy foreign
currency reserves.
Maintaining the ﬁxed exchange rate at t requires that reserves remain
above some critical level. This determines a minimum interest rate it
H that
must be maintained if the government is to defend the ﬁxed parity, where it
H
will depend on both ptand  t. On the basis of  tand it
H, the government then
decides in each period whether to defend the ﬁxed exchange rate (denoted
by choice of policy F) by holding the interest rate at it
H, or not to defend the
parity and devalue (a policy N), consistent with a lower interest rate, which
we will call it
o.
A number of features allow this dynamic signaling model to be kept
simple without sacriﬁcing the robustness of the basic insights. First, I con-
sider an irreversible decision to abandon the ﬁxed parity (in a way that will
be made clear later). The important assumption is that not defending has a
discrete cost. Considering, for example, a return to a ﬁxed rate at some
point in the future makes the model too complicated, whereas my goal is to
illustrate the analytics of interest rate defense as a signal as simply as pos-
sible. What is central to a signaling approach is that demonstrating com-
mitment to not abandoning the ﬁxed rate is costly, where this cost is unob-
served. Second, I concentrate on the decision of whether to raise interest
rates, rather than how much to raise them (that is, on the optimal path of in-
terest rates and reserves in defense of a ﬁxed rate). This is reﬂected in the
modeling assumption of a reserve target and a minimum interest rate in-
crease consistent with maintaining the ﬁxed rate. I discuss later some impli-
cations of raising interest rates to even higher levels to signal even greater
“toughness.”
Third, for simplicity of exposition, I do not explicitly model the decision
of speculators. (See Drazen 2000 for an explicit model.) For an interest rate
40 Allan Drazendefense to be possible, there must be some deviation from interest rate par-
ity. Simple uncovered interest parity cannot hold if the central bank is to
have the ability to raise the interest rate in order to increase the net cost of
speculation. Diﬀerent models of interest rate defense use diﬀerent argu-
ments in this respect. In Drazen (2001), I assumed that speculators face an
upward-sloping borrowing schedule when they borrow to ﬁnance their
speculation. Hence, the speculators’ decision implies a well-deﬁned de-
mand curve for borrowing at each point as a function of the interest cost of
borrowing and expectations about a devaluation over the immediate future.
Combined with the previous assumption about a level of reserves consistent
with not abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate, this implies that at any point
in time there is some interest rate that chokes oﬀ speculation in the very
short term. These assumptions allow me to focus on the government’s deci-
sion problem in a signaling context, on the role of uncertainty about the
government’s commitment to ﬁxed rates in driving these decisions, and on
exogenous shocks in determining the dynamics of interest rate defense.
2.2.2 The Government’s Choice Problem
We now consider the workings of the model in more detail. A standard
model of interest rate defense has two actors: speculators, who choose rela-
tive demands for currency given short-term interest rates and their beliefs
about the likelihood of a devaluation in the near term; and the government
(or central bank), which must choose whether and how to defend the cur-
rency in the face of speculative pressure.
Speculators’ behavior may be summarized by the decision of how large a
position to take, given the probability they assign to the ﬁxed exchange
rate’s collapsing over the immediate horizon (call it pt) and the interest cost
of speculation (summarized as it). Speculator behavior implies, as indi-
cated, that demand for reserves is a function of it, of the probability pt, and
of  t, the variable summarizing the state of the economy, where  t has a cu-
mulative distribution N( t), which we assume is unchanging over time. (We
return to this assumption later.) As indicated above, this determines an in-
terest rate consistent with defending the exchange rate in each period de-
noted ii
H. Given ii
H, we can then concentrate on the government’s choice
problem in period t, subject to the constraint that speculators’ beliefs are ra-
tional given the government’s behavior. This will be addressed later.
At time 0, the government announces a commitment to a ﬁxed exchange
rate, and at each subsequent date t  1, . . . , T, the government chooses ei-
ther to maintain the ﬁxed parity (policy F) or to devalue (policy N). In
choosing whether or not to defend in a given period, the government min-
imizes a loss function, reﬂecting the costs it assigns to abandoning the ex-
change rate and the costs of defending. If the government is to maintain
the ﬁxed parity in period t, it must raise the interest rate to the level ii
H. This
implies a cost of high interest rates to the economy, denoted  (it
H,  t), where
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rates: the negative impact on economic activity; the eﬀect of high interest
rates on the corporate and ﬁnancial sectors, with a risk of destabilizing a
fragile banking system; the negative impact on mortgage interest rates, es-
pecially when these rates are directly indexed to money market rates and
defense of the exchange rate requires holding market rates high for signif-
icant periods; and the impact of interest rates on increasing the govern-
ment budget deﬁcit. We assume that increases in   represent a worsening
of the economy, so that an increase in  t implies that  ( ,  t) rises for any
value of it. 
If the government chooses not to maintain the ﬁxed parity, interest rates
can be kept lower, at a level it
o. For simplicity it is assumed that  (it
o,  )   0,
which is simply a normalization. However, abandoning the commitment to
the ﬁxed exchange rate has a cost xin the period of a devaluation and there-
after. This represents both the social loss the government assigns to aban-
doning the ﬁxed rate (that is, the value to the economy that the government
had put on maintaining ﬁxed rates) and the cost it assigns to having reneged
on its commitment to a ﬁxed exchange rate.2 It is assumed that a ﬁxed ex-
change rate has no other costs per se, that is, costs associated with ﬁxed rates
themselves, rather than with the defense of ﬁxed rates. (Alternatively, we
could think of  ( , ) as including such costs.) It is assumed that x is not ob-
served by speculators, where governments can diﬀer in their x, that is, in the
cost they assign to abandoning the ﬁxed exchange rate. A government that
is more committed to defending the ﬁxed rate is thus modeled as having a
higher value of x. Whereas the policy maker knows his type, speculators
know only the distribution of possible types x, as summarized by an initial
distribution G(x), initially deﬁned over [x
 
, x  ], where x
 
 0 is the lowest pos-
sible type at the beginning of period one. This distribution will be updated
over time as a function of observed actions in a way that will be made ex-
plicit below.
The decision of a government of whether or not to defend in any period
tcan then be represented as comparing the cost of abandoning the exchange
rate to the cost of defending it. Given our assumptions on the irreversibil-
ity of the decision to abandon, so that x must be paid every period there-
after, the cost of abandoning the exchange rate at t can be represented as
(1a) x    x    2x   ...      T t
The immediate cost of defending at t is the loss  (it
H,  t). Defending today
gives the option of either defending or abandoning the exchange rate next
period, depending on which has a lower cost. Defending next period, in
turn, allows the option of defending or not the following period, and so on.
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2. Models of abandoning ﬁxed exchange rates typically do not model the value of ﬁxed rates
per se, so this simple approach is consistent with the literature.Hence, the cost of defending today may be represented as (see the appen-
dix)
(1b)  (it
H,  t)    Etmin [x    x    2x   ...      T t 1, 
 (iH
t 1,  t 1)    Et 1min(   )],
where Et is the expectations operator and  (iH
t 1,  t 1)    t 1 is a random
variable as of t(due to the randomness of  t 1and  t 1as of t), as are all val-
ues of  ( , ) dated t   2 and higher, with a distribution F t 1( t 1) that is in-
duced by the distribution of  t 1. (In other words, the future cost of de-
fending is uncertain because of uncertainty about the future state of the
economy.) In period T the cost of defending is simply  (iT
H,  T), which is
compared to x. Equating equations (1a) and (1b) and assuming that a gov-
ernment that is indiﬀerent defends, one can show that the condition in pe-
riod t for defending the exchange rate is 
(2) x    (it
H,  t)    O t 1,
where O t 1 is deﬁned by the recursive relation
(3a) Ot 1    
 t 1 x  Ot 1
 t 1 0
(x    Ot 1    t 1) dF t 1( t 1)
and the terminal condition
(3b) OT   
 T x
 T 0
(x    T)dF T( T).
(See the appendix.) In equation (2), O t 1 can be interpreted as the option
value of choosing to defend in period t.
Note that equation (2) with equality determines a cutoﬀ type,  xt ∗, who is
just indiﬀerent between defending and not defending (conditional on hav-
ing previously defended), given speculative pressures and  t. Note that an
increase in  , by raising the cost  (it
H,  t) of defending, will raise the cutoﬀ
value xt ∗. This observation will be important later. A government’s problem
of whether to defend is easily represented. A government of type x will de-
fend the exchange rate in period t as long as x   xt ∗. All types that satisfy
this condition will defend; all types that do not and have previously de-
fended will abandon the defense in period t.
2.2.3 The Evolution of Beliefs over Time and the Nature of Equilibrium
Using the above results, we can now consider the signal inherent in high
interest rates. To do this, we must ﬁrst consider how information about the
government’s commitment evolves over time. That is, how does information
about the government’s possible type xevolve as a function of past observed
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ment chose to defend the exchange rate at t, it is known that its type is
greater than or equal to xt ∗. Hence, observing a defense at time timplies that
as of the beginning of time t   1, the lowest possible type is xt ∗; that is, x
 
t 1
 xt ∗. Hence, the set of possible types as of the beginning of time t 1 is [xt ∗,
x  ]. Second, note that if the realization of  t is suﬃciently low, all possible
types at t will defend; that is, xt ∗   x
 
t, so that x
 
t 1   x
 
t.
We can summarize this discussion in terms of the type of equilibrium that
prevails at t and the evolution of beliefs about government type that it im-
plies. If ﬁxed rates had been maintained until t, then if xt ∗   x
 
t (that is, if  t
is suﬃciently low), an equilibrium with no probability of devaluation pre-
vails, that is, a pooling equilibrium. In this case, policy observed in t gives
no new information about type and x
 
t 1   x
 
t. If, instead, xt ∗   x
 
t, then a
separating equilibrium prevails: types in the range [x
 
t, xt ∗) devalue; types in
the range [xt ∗, x  ] maintain ﬁxed rates. Observing a defense provides new in-
formation about possible types that is used to update beliefs. That is, ob-
serving a defense at t when xt ∗   x
 
t, speculators truncate the set of possible
types for t   1, so that x
 
t 1   xt ∗   x
 
t. Formally, based on the policy action
observed in t, speculators update the distribution of possible types and
form a new distribution G(xx
 

























t 1 is deﬁned as above. Updating of possible types provides infor-
mation on the possible course of future policies that is the essence of the sig-
naling argument.
On the basis of the evolution of x
 
t, we can derive rational beliefs of spec-
ulators consistent with optimal government behavior. This closes the
model, because government behavior in each period was based on specula-
tive demand derived from pt, the probability that speculators assigned to a
devaluation. That is, we equate pt to the probability of a devaluation based
on optimal government behavior, where this probability reﬂects beliefs over
possible government types. Given that speculators observe  t before form-
ing their expectation of pt, the probability of a devaluation in the current pe-
riod, conditional on no previous devaluation’s having been observed, is
simply the probability that x lies in the interval [x
 
t, xt ∗) conditional on the
cumulative distribution G(xx
 




2.2.4 High Interest Rates as a Signal
The signal content of high interest rates follows from the nature of a sep-
arating equilibrium as described above. When there is a nonzero probabil-
ity that a government would not defend (which is necessary for speculators
44 Allan Drazento launch an attack), a defense leads to a discrete upward revision in xt. This
implies a discrete upward revision in the probability of a future defense un-
der any circumstances in which this probability was less than 1. (That is, for
any realization of  t such that xt ∗   x
 
t, an increase in x
 
t raises the probabil-
ity of a defense.) An especially clear example is that a defense under a given
set of circumstances today (that is, for a speciﬁc realization of  t) implies
that the exchange rate will be defended in the future under the same cir-
cumstances.3 (Remember that the distribution of  t was assumed to be un-
changing over time.) This example gives a clear illustration of a dispropor-
tionality eﬀect, because the eﬀect in choking oﬀ future speculation under
identical circumstances is independent of the size of the interest rate in-
crease needed to defend the exchange rate today.
Put another way, this formulation makes it possible to formalize the no-
tion that it may be optimal to hang tough to send a signal, as it were. A gov-
ernment with a relatively high value of xwill ﬁnd it optimal to defend a ﬁxed
exchange rate in circumstances in which weaker (that is, lower x) govern-
ments would not in order to separate itself. By “hanging tough” in diﬃcult
circumstances today, a government can induce speculators to raise their ex-
pectation of the government’s x. This will be especially true when a high
value of  t is seen as transitory.
This model could be extended in several ways. Economic circumstances
could be deteriorating over time, as in the basic ﬁrst-generation model, so
that the cost of defense is becoming progressively higher. (Formally, this
could be represented by the distribution of  t’s changing over time so that
high realizations of   are becoming more likely.) Known deterioration
would generally imply that there is a lower beneﬁt from defending today.
This case is studied in greater detail in Drazen (2001). This eﬀect would be
strengthened if deterioration is endogenous to tough defense, for example,
when a defense weakens the reserve or the ﬁscal position of a country, thus
making it more vulnerable to future attack. This general sort of argument
was explored in a diﬀerent context in Drazen and Masson (1994); we return
to it in section 2.3.3, in the context of signals of the ability to defend the ex-
change rate.
The discussion in the previous two paragraphs should shed light on the
question of whether it is sensible to incur costs today to build a reputation,
in the sense of increasing speculators’ rational expectation of type. It de-
pends on the government’s beliefs about the evolution of  t. If the govern-
ment believes that the current (speculation-inducing) state is transitory,
then incurring high costs today to build a reputation is sensible. On the
other hand, if the high values of  t are believed to have a strong permanent
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3. Technically speaking, the ﬁnite horizon makes this statement inexact, as the same real-
ization of   at a later date implies a diﬀerent choice problem. It will be strictly correct for an
inﬁnite horizon and approximately correct if T is suﬃciently far in the future. Conceptually,
the point being made should be clear.component, then hanging tough to build a reputation not only makes little
sense, but also implies a futile waste of costly resources. The latter scenario
seems to describe the situation of many countries that vainly attempt to
maintain a ﬁxed parity, as in the case of the United Kingdom in the early
1990s.
Another extension is to consider the possibility of raising the interest rate
even higher than what is necessary to deter current speculation (what we
called it
H). One might argue that such action is the essence of sending a sig-
nal about commitment to defending the ﬁxed exchange rate. I postponed
discussion of this issue until now, because I think that the framework that
has been set out and the discussion in the previous paragraphs make it eas-
ier to understand what is involved. Consider raising the interest rate to a
level it
HH it
H, that is, strictly above what is necessary to defend the exchange
rate. The higher interest rate implies a higher economic cost  (it
HH,  ), so that
the associated cutoﬀ level would be xt ∗∗   xt ∗. Hence, a tougher reputation
could be obtained (in the sense of a lower value of G(xt ∗∗x
 
t)) at the cost of
a larger current economic loss from the interest rate policy used to defend
the exchange rate. Allowing a choice of the level of the interest rate used to
defend the exchange rate could then be analyzed in a signaling model in
terms of considering this tradeoﬀin an intertemporal context. I do not pur-
sue the details here.
2.3 Signaling Ability to Defend the Exchange Rate
The foregoing model does not allow for interest rate defense to send a
negative signal. That is, there is no possibility that raising interest rates in
the face of a speculative attack not only may fail to reduce speculative pres-
sures over time, but may actually serve to increase them. Both speciﬁc
episodes and the ﬁndings of Kraay (1999) suggest that this is a real possi-
bility. Because there was only one way to defend the exchange rate in the
model, defense signals commitment and thus has a positive eﬀect. Hence,
one may ask what signal might be sent by use of interest rate defense when
it is used in place of another defense option. This is exactly the question
posed in Drazen (2000), in which it is shown that, depending on what gov-
ernment characteristics are unobserved, an interest defense may send a
negative or mixed signal. In this section we explore this possibility more
fully.
In the previous section we concentrated on signaling commitment to de-
fend the exchange rate, with speculation being fueled by the belief that a
government is not willing to bear too-high costs of defending the exchange
rate. Speculation against a currency may also reﬂect the belief that the gov-
ernment lacks the ability or the resources to defend the exchange rate. The
most basic argument here is that a government lacks the reserves to defend
46 Allan Drazenthe exchange rate, where neither the central bank’s reserve position nor its
commitment to ﬁxed rates is fully observed by speculators,4 and govern-
ments may diﬀer in both of these dimensions, that is, in their type.
2.3.1 Interest Rate versus Borrowing Defense
The starting point is that, in reality, a central bank has a number of ac-
tions available to it in meeting a speculative attack. It may intervene in ei-
ther the forward or the spot market; if it intervenes in the spot market, in-
tervention may be ﬁnanced either with its own reserves or with borrowed
reserves; it may restrict domestic credit to speculators or raise the interest
rate at which they borrow; or it may put controls on credit to speciﬁc bor-
rowers or on other foreign exchange operations (such as foreign exchange
swaps). Except for the strategy of imposing credit controls, active defense
strategies come down to either letting interest rates increase to reduce spec-
ulative demand, or using its reserves to meet demand (or some combination
of these). This strategy often entails borrowing reserves to meet large out-
ﬂows, hence the term borrowing defense.
The key point is that when both a borrowing and an interest rate defense
are possible, these strategies have diﬀerent costs, depending on whether
there is a devaluation. If the ﬁxed rate is successfully defended, then the re-
serve outﬂow associated with the attack will be reversed, so that borrowing
can be easily paid back. The cost is the interest cost of borrowing, although
this may not be large, especially if borrowing is from other central banks
under existing short-term ﬁnancing facilities. However, if there is a devalu-
ation, then closing the short position in foreign currency can be quite costly.
It is this that leads central banks to limit their short positions and that con-
stitutes the principal direct cost of a borrowing defense. Hence, the cost of
a borrowing defense may be less than that of an interest rate defense if de-
fense is successful, but greater if it is unsuccessful.
Denoting by  H,  ZS, and  ZUan interest rate defense (with or without de-
valuation), a successful borrowing defense, and an unsuccessful borrowing
defense, we may represent relative costs by the ranking
(5)  ZU( )    H( )    ZS( ).
The key assumption is that  ZU    H; that is, an unsuccessful borrowing de-
fense is seen by the government as more costly than an interest rate defense.
In other words, a borrowing defense is preferred if it is successful but not if
it is unsuccessful. The source of this distinction is the signiﬁcant capital loss
on its short foreign currency position that a central bank will suﬀer if it bor-
rows massively and then devalues.
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4. The idea is that published statistics on foreign exchange reserves do not give a fully accu-
rate picture of reserves available to defend the exchange rate.2.3.2 A Basic Model: Setup
The role of these assumptions can be seen in a model that is a variant of
the one presented in section 2.2. A full treatment may be found in Drazen
(2000). A key change is that there must be a possibility that the government
mounts a defense that subsequently fails. Abandoning the ﬁxed exchange
rate may reﬂect not only a policy decision even when reserves are suﬃcient
to continue, but also the realization of an adverse reserve shock. For sim-
plicity of exposition, we represent this as a probability q(Rt), where Rt are
reserves of the central bank at the beginning of the period, and where
q  0. As indicated above, it is assumed that speculators do not observe the
government’s reserve position as of the beginning of the period, as well as
not observing their x.
In this extended model, the sequencing of actions is as follows. At the be-
ginning of each period, speculators choose how much to speculate against
the currency, on the basis of previously and currently observed variables,
the distribution of unobserved variables, the probability they assign to a de-
valuation at the end of the period on the basis of those distributions, and
the interest cost of speculation. The central bank then chooses whether to
defend the ﬁxed exchange rate and, if so, whether to do so via borrowing or
raising interest rates. (If it chooses not to defend, it devalues at the begin-
ning of the period.) After the central bank has chosen a defense, there is a
shock to reserves that may force a devaluation, as represented in the pre-
vious paragraph. Hence, the model allows both devaluation as a policy
choice, consistent with second-generation models of currency crisis, and
devaluation as unavoidable, due, for example, to running out of reserves, as
in ﬁrst-generation models of currency collapse. At the end of the period,
speculators exchange their foreign currency for domestic currency and pay
oﬀ their borrowing. In the case of no devaluation, speculators update the
probability of a devaluation in the following period.
2.3.3 Signaling Ability to Defend
One may then ask how a government will behave when both its x and its
R are not observed. A key result in Drazen (2000) is that a government that
chooses an interest rate defense is one with a high xbut a low R, that is, with
a strong commitment to ﬁxed rates to defend, but with a relatively weak re-
serve position. The result and the intuition behind it may be illustrated by
period T. With a probability q of a devaluation and using the fact that the
loss from an interest rate defense is the same whether or not there is a de-
valuation, the expected loss from an interest defense is
(6) q(x    H)   (1   q) H   qx    H,
and the expected loss from a borrowing defense that implies the same level
of reserves is
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Equating equations (9) and (10), we obtain a critical value of the devalua-
tion probability, which we will call q∗
T( ), such that the government is indiﬀ-




T   q 1[q∗
T( )].
For RT   R∗
T, equation (5) implies that the expected loss from an interest
rate defense in equation (6) exceeds the expected loss from a borrowing de-
fense in equation (7), so that a borrowing defense is chosen, whereas for RT
  R∗
T, the ranking of the expected loss from the two policies is reversed, so
that the interest rate defense is chosen.
Drazen (2000) shows (in the context of a two-period example that could
be extended) that the government’s decision in an earlier period is similarly
characterized once the signal inherent in type of defense is taken into ac-
count; that is, a government with reserves below a critical level will choose
an interest rate defense (if it chooses to defend), whereas one with a higher
level of reserves will choose a borrowing defense. The intuition of these re-
sults is straightforward. Suppose that the ﬁxed rate must be abandoned if
the reserve position is too low and that the reserve position is also aﬀected
by exogenous reserve shocks, as discussed above. Then a central bank with
a low level of reserves would have a greater incentive to hold onto its re-
serves than one with a high level of reserves and, hence, would be more
likely to use an interest rate defense than a reserve defense to try to main-
tain the ﬁxed rate. (Of course, in a separating equilibrium, low reserve gov-
ernments ﬁnd it optimal to choose the interest rate defense in spite of the
negative signal it sends, due to the risks of either letting reserves run down
or borrowing reserves.) Hence, raising interest rates would signal low re-
serves and thus may only encourage further speculation.5 To employ our
earlier terminology, if the raising of interest rates is taken as a signal of low
reserves, there may be a “perverse feedback” eﬀect.
Conditional on the type of defense chosen, we can then ask the question
of whether a defense is undertaken. This is the question addressed in section
2.2. Combining those results with the results here, one may argue that ob-
serving an interest rate defense indicates that RT   R∗
T and that x   x∗
t.
Hence, an interest rate defense is a mixed signal, as it indicates a high de-
gree of commitment to the ﬁxed rate but a low level of R, that is, weak fun-
damentals.
An alternative story is one in which high interest rates signal strong fun-
damentals. Suppose that rather than reserves, the key fundamental that is
not fully observed is the government’s ﬁscal position. To see why this can be
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5. In common parlance, a high interest rate defense might signal that the government is pan-
icking due to a weak reserve position.a positive signal when the ﬁscal position is unobserved, consider ﬁrst the
case in which it is observed. High interest rates weaken the government’s ﬁs-
cal position, so that a tough defense today may actually lower the credibil-
ity of the ﬁxed rate tomorrow due to the deterioration in the ﬁscal position
it implies. (This is the eﬀect stressed by Drazen and Masson 1994.) This is
true both for weak ﬁscal fundamentals and for other structural weaknesses.
It also suggests one reason that an interest rate defense is not mounted, as
in the case of the United Kingdom in September 1992.
If the ﬁscal position is unobserved, then the willingness to raise the in-
terest rate may signal a strong ﬁscal position, because the negative impact
of high rates may be stronger the weaker is the ﬁscal position. That is, the
worse the ﬁscal position, the less willing the government will be to raise in-
terest rates to defend the currency (and the more fragile is the ﬁxed ex-
change rate if the government’s ﬁscal position is important to its health).
Hence, if, for example, the level of government debt is not fully observed,
raising interest rates in defense of the currency is a signal of ﬁscal health and
may have a positive eﬀect in deterring speculation beyond what the increase
in the arithmetic cost of borrowing would imply.
To close the model, one calculates the probability that the ﬁxed exchange
rate collapses in a period, where this includes the possibility that the govern-
ment chooses not to defend and that the ﬁxed rate collapses due to an exoge-
nous shock, and where this depends on the distribution of the unobserved
fundamental. For example, in the case of unobserved reserves and commit-
ment, the probability that speculators assign to collapse would be of the form
(9) pt    
Rt
{G[xt ∗(Rt)jt 1]   1   G[xt ∗(Rt)jt 1] (Rt)}d (Rtjt 1)
where  (Rt) is the probability of a shock forcing devaluation conditional on
Rt, G[xt ∗(Rt)jt–1] is the cumulative distribution of commitment types con-
ditional on policy previously observed, denoted jt–1, and  (Rtjt–1) is the cu-
mulative distribution of reserves conditional on the policy previously ob-
served. Lower reserves make a devaluation more likely both because a given
x type is less likely to defend and because, having chosen to defend, he is
more likely to be forced to devalue due to an exogenous shock.
2.4 Testing the Signaling Approach
In this section, we quickly review some evidence on whether the signaling
approach is relevant, based on Hubrich (2000) and Drazen and Hubrich
(2002).
2.4.1 Country Characteristics
Hubrich (2000) considers whether the eﬀectiveness of restrictive mone-
tary policy during an attack actually diﬀers according to certain character-
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in a large cross-country sample of speculative attacks on ﬁxed exchange
rates. Attacks are identiﬁed as large observations of an index aggregating
reserve losses and exchange rate devaluations. The policy variables consid-
ered are domestic credit (the net domestic assets on the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet) and the nominal discount rate. The stance of policy is deter-
mined as the policy during the attack relative to a prior average, where of
course a contractionary policy refers to contractions in domestic credit or
increases in the discount rate. The sample is then split into a high and a low
subsample according to a certain characteristic, and the policy rule has
been obtained separately for each subsample. Comparing the policy rule
between the two subsamples, Hubrich examines whether the policy pursued
during an attack is related to country characteristics in a way that, if the
characteristic were unobserved, could signal crucial information. He ﬁnds
that contractionary policies are more likely for countries characterized by
low reserves or low public debt. The former is fully consistent with the per-
verse signaling eﬀect previously discussed, whereby governments with low
prior reserves are more likely to use an interest rate defense than a reserve-
based defense. The latter ﬁnding is in line with the positive signaling argu-
ment presented for the case of unobserved ﬁscal fundamentals, whereby a
country with high public debt is averse to an interest rate defense because
of the impact on its ﬁscal position.
However, note that these ﬁndings are a rather weak test for the signaling
hypothesis. If we found these characteristics did not matter (or mattered in
the wrong direction), such a ﬁnding wouldhave constituted strong evidence
against signaling. However, ﬁnding that the policy rule does diﬀer in the re-
quired manner is only the ﬁrst step toward a signaling mechanism. In addi-
tion, signaling requires that these characteristics are not observed by in-
vestors, which is much more diﬃcult to establish and was not pursued in
Hubrich (2000).
2.4.2 The Term Structure of Exchange Rate Expectations
Because the signaling framework outlined above is based on policy pro-
viding information about exchange rate fundamentals otherwise unob-
served, a natural direct test consists of relating exchange rate expectations
to that policy. Signaling models suggest that “temporary” policies have per-
manent eﬀects, in the sense that the signaling eﬀect of high interest rates
may outlast the high interest rate policy itself. This can be examined by
looking at the term structure of exchange rate expectations: does interest
rate policy aﬀect exchange rate expectations similarly at all horizons, or
does it only have an impact on short-term expectations? The more the eﬀect
is spread out across the entire term structure, the more it would seem that
something fundamental is being signaled. Drazen and Hubrich (2002) pres-
ent evidence using a set of survey data for exchange rate forecasts of diﬀer-
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tions during the 1992–93 ERM crisis and in Brazil during the various crises
between 1994 and 1998.
As far as signaling, there were several key ﬁndings. First, although there
was generally little or no clear statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of raising inter-
est rates on next month’s expected exchange rate, this result masks signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects on diﬀerent components of the expected exchange rate and at
diﬀerent horizons. There was some evidence of a positive (i.e., appreciating
the exchange rate) short-term eﬀect, coupled with a negative longer-term
eﬀect, at horizons of twelve months or longer. An increase in overnight in-
terest rates often induces an increase in the n month ahead rate relative to
the k month ahead rate (n   k), thus implying an appreciation of next
month’s exchange rate, but also an increase in risk premiums and the ex-
change rate forecast a year ahead, implying a depreciation.
Second, the eﬀects of changes in overnight interest rates that are ob-
served are clearly nonlinear, often signiﬁcantly so, and these eﬀects may be
either concave or convex. This is in contrast to the simple “arithmetic” ar-
gument for the eﬀect of raising interest rates, but it is consistent with the sig-
naling explanation (as well as some other explanations). The eﬀects are
mostly smaller in absolute value the larger the total interest rate increase is.
This suggests that much of the information eﬀect is already triggered by
comparatively small interest rate defenses and that resorting to very high in-
terest rates adds little information.
To summarize, the typical picture is that short-term eﬀects are negative
(representing improved expectations) for the very short term, and then they
gradually increase as the term becomes longer, ending up in positive terri-
tory for the forecasts twelve months out or more (representing a deteriora-
tion of long-term expectations). Drazen and Hubrich (2002) suggested that
this may reﬂect two signaling eﬀects at work. First, there is a short-term
eﬀect, in that high interest rates today signal high interest rates (or strong
commitment) for a couple of months to come. This eﬀect is skewed toward
the short term and dominates the short-term results, but it dies out in the
medium to long term. The other eﬀect is a negative signaling eﬀect, in which
high interest rates signal bad news about the overall fundamentals of the
peg, deteriorating expectations at all horizons alike. This negative eﬀect is
outweighed by the policy signal in the short term, but it comes through
dominantly in the medium to long term as the policy signal dies out. This
picture is consistent with the mixed signal of an interest rate defense dis-
cussed at the end of section 2.3.
Drazen and Hubrich ﬁnd that that these results are remarkably consis-
tent across the countries in their sample, including Brazil. This suggests that
signaling eﬀects are surprisingly similar among ﬁxed exchange rate regimes,
even when the countries behind them are fairly diﬀerent.
A ﬁnal note of caution. Some of these ﬁndings are also consistent with
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Stiglitz (1998) that the eﬀect of high interest rates on the banking sector
leads to an increase in default risk. They are also in part consistent with
ﬁrst-generation models of interest rate defense (see Flood and Jeanne 2000
or Lahiri and Végh 2000) in which an interest rate defense may bring the cri-
sis forward because of its impact on the very macroeconomic fundamentals
(speciﬁcally, debt) underlying the peg.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper I have set out some basic results on the signaling eﬀect of
high interest rates. As was indicated in the introduction, the goal was nei-
ther to present a comprehensive or extremely technical exposition, nor to
concentrate on new results. The aim was to present a fairly simple presen-
tation of the main concepts and results, with the hope of making the ideas
clear for a wider audience. My further aim was to try to convince readers of
the usefulness of this approach in explaining the empirical ﬁndings about
the eﬀectiveness of interest rate defense. To this end, I also reviewed some
econometric evidence consistent with the signaling approach. Although the
tests are open to alternative explanations, they provide signiﬁcant evidence
toward the importance of signaling.
Appendix
We here derive the condition in equation (2) for an interest rate defense and
the associated deﬁnition for O t. In period T, the condition for a defense is
obviously
(A1) x    (iT
H,  T).
As of period T– 1, the central bank may devalue (at a present discounted
cost of x    x) or may defend, in which case it faces a cost of  (iH
T–1,  T–1)  
 T–1 and then chooses optimally in period T according to equation (A1).
Thus, the condition for a defense in period T – 1 is
(A2) x    x    (iH
T 1,  T 1)    ET 1 min(x,  T),
where  Tis a random variable as of time T– 1. The “min” operator implies that
(A3) ET 1min(x,  T)   
 T x
 T 0
 TdF( T)   
 T  
 T x
xdF( T)   x   
 T x
 T 0
(x    T)dF( T),
so that equation (A2) becomes
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 T x
 T 0
(x    T)dF( T),
with the second term on the right-hand side deﬁning OT. Similarly, in period
T – 2, we may write the condition for a defense as
(A5) x    x    2x 
   (iH
T 2,  T 2)    ET 2 min{x    x,  T 1    ET 1min[x,  T]},
where  T and  T–1 are random variables as of time T – 2. Working from the
inside bracket outward, one obtains
(A6) x    T 2     
 T 1 x  OT
 T 1 0
(x    T 1)dF( T 1),
with the second term on the right-hand side deﬁning OT–1. In this manner
one can easily derive that the condition for a defense in period t is as given
in equation (2).
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54 Allan DrazenComment Robert P. Flood
The last time I commented on Allan Drazen’s work on the interest rate de-
fense of a ﬁxed exchange rate was at the Spring International Finance and
Macroeconomics meeting in Cambridge two years ago. I now think I got
the interest rate defense issue almost half right at those meetings.
My discussion then was connected to Drazen’s work at three points.
First, both Drazen’s work and my discussion took oﬀ from some kind of
policy-exploitable wedge in the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation.
Without such a wedge, interest rate policy has no real-interest rate implica-
tions and is either a nonstarter—end of story—or it is really a nominal ag-
gregates defense.
Second, in all of the work, beliefs about future policy actions determine,
in part, market reactions to current policy moves. That’s pretty standard.
Drazen’s emphasis has been on the rational formation of beliefs by private
agents concerning some relevant information known only to the policy
maker that cannot be revealed directly to the public in a completely con-
vincing way.
Third, the two strands of work are “connected in the breach” in terms of
ﬁscal policy. In, for example, Flood and Jeanne (2000; hereafter FJ), the real
primary ﬁscal deﬁcit/surplus is assumed invariant to the interest rate de-
fense. This, plus perfect capital mobility, is the source of FJ’s results. In
Drazen’s work, in contrast, feedback from the ﬁscal deﬁcit is not modeled.
I am fairly sure the only way he could be ignoring ﬁscal implications is if it
is assumed implicitly that the primary deﬁcit/surplus adjusts to pay the cost
of the interest defense.
In my discussion today I want to do two things while keeping my eye on
one other thing: First, as I said above, my previous discussion was almost
half right. In later work (FJ), Olivier Jeanne and I got it completely half
right. I would like to show the direction that I now think is more than half
right. Second, I’ll talk a little toward the end about adding aspects of sig-
naling about future policy moves in this setup. Third, while I do the above,
I will be clear about this ﬁscal deﬁcit/surplus.
Here is a quick recap of the FJ-type results. FJ is a shadow-rate model
(i.e., hypothetical ﬂex rate with reserves exhausted). The FJ “money stuﬀ”
is suppressed presently.1
it   i∗   Etet 1   et     
N
P t
t    portfolio balance
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Robert P. Flood is a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund.
1. At the end of this comment I discuss some of the (not very important) shortcuts, for ex-










   nominal deﬁcit
ln(P)   e PPP
where N is nominal debt, P is the price level, d is the real deﬁcit/surplus,
(g – t) minus real seigniorage, for simplicity. In FJ, after an attack, the real
side of the model is ﬁxed and N/P   PV(d), where PV represents the pres-
ent value operator.
These are the results:
1. Raising i before a potential speculative attack always depreciates the
shadow currency and thereby brings the attack closer in time.
2. Raising iafter a speculative attack can appreciate the shadow value of
the currency before the attack (strengthen the currency) if the economy is
on the upward-sloping part of seignorage “Laﬀer Curve;” that is, raising i
post-collapse will increase d through seigniorage. 
Although I’m sure FJ is logically correct, I’m just as sure that the seignior-
age Laﬀer curve really can’t be what’s going on here. If the above is half
right, which I think it is, what is (somewhat) more than half right?
Let’s make the following changes:
it
s   i∗s   Etet 1 – et     
N
P t
t   
represents portfolio balance (watch for little s’s). I am now using the port-
folio balance condition for short-term debt, denoted s. Disaggregate gov-
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This is the nominal deﬁcit again, but with debt shares. The short-term debt
share is  , with 0    1. Watch d. Remember too that il
t–1 is contractual
from last period.
Finally, make price (P) predetermined2
ln(P t)   Et 1et sticky prices.
The way I want to pay for the interest rate increase here is with Nduring pe-
riod tand then for Pdto increase permanently next period by just enough to
service the new debt. The budget was balanced before the interest rate de-
fense, and it returns to balance in the period after the defense. This is needed
just to keep the math simple. (Drazen must be doing something like this in
the background, or else his ﬁxed rate would explode. More on this later.)
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2. This is the model of Flood and Engel (1985), with an as yet unspeciﬁed yield curve.To see how the model works, let   1, and suppose it is announced and
believed that it
s is to be increased by, say, 10 percentage points (e.g., 0.10 to
0.20) for one period (one year) and then returned to its previous level and
the budget rebalanced. Then, with N t and P t predetermined, N t 1 will in-
crease by 10 percent as will other nominal variables. Since et 1 will rise by
the full 0.10, the current level of et need not move. The defense is ineﬀec-
tive—worse, actually, in terms of next period.
Now suppose 0    1: not all debt is short-term. Holding il
t–1 ﬁxed by
contract at t– 1, Nincreases now by the proportion  ∗0.10, and other nom-
inal variables increase in the same proportion. Since it
s rose by the full 0.10,
however, et must fall by (1 –  )∗0.10.
The implication is simple, plausible, and pretty obvious: low short-term
(ST) debt makes it possible to “stick it to” long-term (LT) debt owners in an
eﬀective surprise temporary defense. Basically, the unwary LT debt owners
are being taxed with a capital loss that is passed on to money and ST debt
owners.
That a temporary short-term interest rate increase can strengthen the
(shadow) currency when prices are sticky is an “interest rate policy update”
of the famous Dornbusch overshooting result. Recall Dornbusch’s ﬁnding
that a (surprise) once-and-for-all monetary increase results in a more than
proportionate short-term currency depreciation. Presently, a (surprise)
short-term interest rate increase results in an equal increase in expected cur-
rency depreciation and future nominal debt expansion. Positioning for the
required expected depreciation may require an initial currency appreciation
(the ﬂip side of overshooting).
The following are some things to work on:
1. There is a long-term bond price that I have left out for simplicity. A
term-structure theory will price new LT bonds. (Second-period LTs are
priced at [{1  il
t–1}/{1  it
s}], but ﬁrst-period LT pricing needs a bit of mod-
eling. For now I’m assuming 100 percent ST ﬁnancing on the margin.)
2. There seems to be a government versus LT bond holder game that
must be lowering the price of LT bonds and inﬂuencing deﬁcit ﬁnancing.
This may be making countries move more toward ST debt ﬁnancing, par-
ticularly in turbulent times.
3. The way we got the math to work out is if the private sector believes
with probability 1 that the interest rate increase is temporary, one period. If
it lasts longer (say it dies away at the rate   where 0    1), then Etet 1 will
rise by more than  ∗0.10, so et need not fall.
Somehow the government must convince the private sector about tempo-
rariness with reference to is and about the debt-service cleanup with future
Pd. This is exactly the problem Drazen is addressing, but in a slightly diﬀer-
ent setting. He uses is to convey both the promise of an interest check to
bond holders and information about likely future actions.
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agents who use unlimited data to infer correctly average future policy ac-
tions—the standard rational expectations methodology of the 1970s and
1980s. The innovation of many more recent models is an apparent “taste
change” by both policy makers and researchers. Agents in the newer mod-
els have more realistic data endowments and therefore cannot possibly de-
termine perfectly average future government actions.
Complete models that have both signaling and (say) KFG fundamentals
will have reduced-form coeﬃcients on fundamentals with a KFG part and
a signaling part. Model-constrained estimation will allocate the importance
of the parts.
Finally, there are two more areas that warrant further work:
1. Although the interest rate defense may have worked this period, there
is nothing we have done to indicate it did not set in motion events that will
spell the ﬁxed rate’s demise next period.
2. When Drazen discusses his and Hubrich’s key empirical ﬁndings he
invokes a second signaling eﬀect, which makes all this appear remarkably
similar to the standard fundamentals story.
These are some places where I have cheated (a little):
1. The complete (in levels) UIP “wedge” is  [(N– M)/P]. I’ve left out the
M/P term. It complicates things but does not change the argument funda-
mentally.
2. d   g – t   i(M/P)
3. In the disaggregated part, I’ve said that the wedge in ST UIP depends
on real ratio aggregate debt N/P, where N is total debt.
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Discussion Summary
Michael P. Dooley remarked that if a successful interest rate defense de-
pends on whether the incurred losses are imposed on the private sector, it is
crucial whether the government is truly separated from the private sector.
Andrew Berg noted that Hong Kong conducted an interest rate defense
without a large change in debt position.
58 Allan DrazenVince Reinhart remarked that a successful defense has implications for
the term structure of interest rates and asked about the consequences of the
endogeneity of interest rate defenses. He pointed to the question of whether
the costs of a defense are hurting the government or the society as a whole
and noted that in the discussant’s model the costs are inﬂicted on the hold-
ers of consols.
Robert P. Floodremarked that the interest rate defense is factored into the
long-run prices of debt.
John McHale made reference to the early stages of the Asian crisis and
pointed to the importance of transparency.
Olivier Jeanneremarked that the presented model would beneﬁt from the
addition of two-sided imperfect information.
Allan Drazen acknowledged that two-sided imperfect information is de-
sirable, but it also substantially complicates the model. He remarked that
the economic costs of giving in to a speculative attack are not the only costs
incurred; there is also the cost of losing face to be considered. Regarding the
issue of whether the private sector or the government picks up the tab, he ar-
gued that a government will have an incentive for setting up an interest rate
defense and inﬂicting the costs of borrowing on others, provided that there
is time to readjust the ﬁscal position after the attack.
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